The Algorithmic Republic (ENG)

Abstract

This essay treats the rise of automated systems as a shift in decisional regime rather than a new ethical dilemma. Modern institutions were built to govern decisions that were discrete, slow, and attributable. Current technical systems operate at a speed and scale that exceed direct human capacity for intervention. Effective power migrates toward whichever systems decide with least operational friction, while formal legitimacy remains lodged in bodies that no longer control the process. The essay defines the minimum institutional architecture needed to absorb automated systems without letting them accumulate sovereignty through inertia. It proposes a functional separation between analysis, execution, control, and audit. It identifies explicit zones of non-delegation, including irreversible decisions about identifiable individuals, restrictions on fundamental rights, the strategic use of force, lawmaking, control of public opinion, and structural bioethical decisions. It outlines mechanisms for detecting and correcting functional overreach, along with personal liability for improper delegation. The central argument holds that the relevant question concerns which decisions a system can absorb without undermining the architecture that legitimizes it. That question displaces the conventional focus on AI consciousness or intent.